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Used Products and Strict Liability: A Practical 
Approach to a Complex Problem 
From early times common-law judges have been concerned 
about the liability of those who manufacture and sell products 
to the public.' In 1916, Justice Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson 
v. Buick Motor Co.' revolutionized the field of products liability. 
The decision imposed liability on the manufacturer of a product 
which was "reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril" 
despite the absence of privity between the injured consumer and 
the manufa~turer.~ Since MacPherson, courts have tended to 
move away from the older and sometimes more troublesome the- 
ories of negligence and warranty and have imposed strict liabil- 
ity on manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers.' In the past 
decade, proponents of the theory have argued, with varying suc- 
cess, that strict liability should be imposed in new areas of con- 
sumer protection: leasing,' services,@ and sales of used products.' 
This Comment wil l  address the application of strict liability 
to sellers of used products, a developing area of the law in which 
courts have reached conflicting and often confusing results. Two 
early cases, Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Coma nd Tur- 
ner v. International Harvester Co.,@ examined the public poli- 
cies underlying strict liability and its application to the sellers of 
used goods. The Turner Court concluded that the sellers should 
1. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). See also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS 5 402A, Comment b (1965). 
2. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, 175 N.Y.S. app. 382 (1916). 
3. Id. at  389, 111 N.E. at  1053, 175 N.Y.S. app. at  389. 
4. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, he., 59 Cal. 2d 57,377 P.2d 897,27 
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 
(1960). See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK F THE LAW OF TORTS 654-57 (4th ed. 1971). 
5. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970). 
6. Raritan Trucking Corp. v. Aero Commander, Inc., 458 F.2d 1106 (3d Cir. 1972); 
Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969). See also Greenfield, Con- 
sumer Protection in Service Transactions-Implied Warranties and Strict Liability in 
Tort, 1974 UTAH L. REV. 661. 
7. Turner v. International Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62 (1975). 
See also Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 337 (1973). 
8. 61 Ill. 2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785 (1975). 
9. 133 N.J. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62 (1975). 
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be held strictly liable; the Peterson court, that they should not.1° 
To further confuse the matter, some courts appeared to reason 
that the possible application of strict liability to sellers of used 
products was a "yes or no," "black or white" question." Some 
made no substantial analyses of the policy considerations.12 To 
make matters worse, the treatise writers, along with the drafts- 
men of the Uniform Product Liability Law, offered no concrete 
solutions to the problem of whether to extend strict liability to 
sellers of used products.13 
There are probably two major reasons for the confusion in 
this area of the law: (1) The courts often disagree on what public 
policies support the imposition of strict liability upon sellers of 
used products;14 and (2) unlike sellers of new products, who 
through indemnification can pass back losses to the entities re- 
sponsible, sellers of used goods will face difficulty in obtaining 
indemnification or may be denied indemnification altogether. It 
is therefore difficult to determine what legal burdens the class of 
sellers of used products can and should bear." 
Imposing strict liability on sellers of used products presents 
10. For discussions of these cases, see Metzger, Products Liability and the Seller of 
Used Goods, 15 AM. Bus. L.J. 159 (1977); Comment, Sales of Defective Used Products: 
Should Strict Liability Apply?, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 805 (1979); Note, Strict Liability Not 
Applicable to Used Car Dealers Absent Actual Creation of Defect, 25 DE PAUL L. REV. 
574 (1976); Note, Strict Products Liability for Used Car Dealers, 63 KY. L.J. 826 (1975); 
Note, Seller of Used Product with Safety Defect May be Held Strictly Liable in Tort 
for Personal Injuries, 7 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 405 (1976); Note, Turner v. International Har- 
vester Company: Strictly Speaking, Can Section 402A Be Extended to Hold Used Car 
Dealers Liable in Tort?, 21 S.D.L. REV. 468 (1976); Note, Strict Liability is Imposed on 
the Sellers of a Defective Used Product, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 196 (1976); Note, Strict Lia- 
bility in Tort Applied to Seller of Used Automobile, 42 TENN. L. REV. 426 (1975); Note, 
Dealer-Seller of Used Car Held Strictly Liable in Tort Under Section 402A, 10 TULSA 
L.J. 709 (1975). 
11. See, e.g., Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill. 2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785 
(1975); Lewis v. E.F. Moore, Inc., 87 Montgomery County L. Rpts. 379,42 Pa. D. & C.2d 
614 (1967). 
12. See, e.g., Lewis v. E.F. Moore, Inc., 87 Montgomery County L. Rpta. 379,42 P a  
D. & C.2d 614 (1967); McLain v. Hodge, 474 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971). But see 
Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill. 2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785 (1975); Turner v. 
International Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62 (1975). 
13. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714,62,718 (1979); 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIA- 
B a r n  $16A[4][b][iv] (1980 & Supp. 1980); W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
5 64 (1979). 
14. See the five opinions of the seven members of the Oregon Supreme Court in 
Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 265 Or. 259, 509 P.2d 529 (1973). See also Hovenden v. 
Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). 
15. See Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill. 2d 17, 20-21, 329 N.E.2d 
785, 787 (1975). 
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the overall question of whether to create an essentially new 
cause of action. Manufacturers and sellers of new products are 
presently held liable only for design and manufacturing defects, 
while sellers of used products may also be held strictly liable for 
some defects that arise after the products leave the original dis- 
tribution chain.16 Two recent cases have suggested a partial solu- 
tion to this complex problem. When injuries from used products 
are caused by design and manufacturing defects, these cases call 
for a conditional imposition of strict liability to be applied only 
when there is a special relationship between the seller of used 
goods and the manufacturer or when the used-products seller 
makes representations that make him an insurer of the prod- 
uct.'' However, these cases do not solve the problem of liability 
of sellers of used goods for defects which arise after the product 
has left the original chain of distribution. One court has ad- 
dressed the latter problem and suggested limiting liability for 
these subsequently occurring defects to "safety defects," or de- 
fects in those parts of the used products ordinarily expected to 
receive regular maintenance and replacement? 
This Comment suggests that these two developing lines of 
argument be combined, and that in light of public policy consid- 
erations, strict liability should be imposed on sellers of used 
products as follows: 
1. Enterprise liability should be and is the major policy un- 
derlying strict products liability and in general justifies imposing 
strict liability on sellers of used products. 
2. In the case of design and manufacturing defects, enter- 
prise liability does not justify imposing unconditional strid 
products liability on sellers of used products since manufactur- 
ers are already required to insure all of society against accidents 
resulting from such defects. Therefore, in the case of sellers of 
used products, strict products liability should be imposed for de- 
sign and manufacturing defects only when there is a special rela- 
tionship between the seller of used goods and the manufacturer 
or when the used-products seller makes representations which 
16. Turner v. International Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 290, 336 A.2d 62, 69 
(1975); Hovenden v. Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302, 306 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). 
17. Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 286 Or. 747, 757, 596 P.2d 1299, 1304 (1979); 
Tauber-Arons Auctioneers Co. v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. App. 3d 268, 282, 161 Cal. 
Rptr. 789, 797 (1980). 
18. Turner v. International Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 290, 336 A.2d 62, 69 
(1975). See also Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill. 2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785 
(1976) (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting). 
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make him an insurer of the product. 
3. Where defects arise after the products leave the original 
chain of distribution, the seller of used goods should be liable for 
them only when they existed at the time of sale and the injury 
was caused by a "safety defect." 
Throughout this Comment, the term seller or dealer will re- 
fer to an individual or organization that is engaged in the busi- 
ness of selling either new or used products.la The term defect 
will refer to an unreasonably dangerous condition not contem- 
plated by the ultimate consumer of the product.20 The term 
safety defect will refer to a defect that arises after a product has 
left the original distribution chain and occurs in a part of the 
product which a consumer should reasonably expect to have 
been regularly maintained or replaced. A safety defect can occur 
only in a part vital to the safe operation of the product which 
must be regularly maintained or replaced to avoid injury to the 
consumer and innocent third parties. 
This Comment will briefly discuss the various policies un- 
derlying strict products liabilitfl and then apply them to ex- 
plain why and to what extent strict products liability should be 
imposed on sellers of used products. Legal scholars have formu- 
lated a number of policy justifications for strict products liabil- 
ity," including enterprise liability, risk spreading or distribu- 
tion, deterrence or safety incentives, representation theory or 
implied representation, and compensation of the victim. 
Enterprise liability. An enterprise engaged in selling prod- 
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (l)(a), & Comment f (1965). 
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comments g & i (1965). 
21. See Turner v. International Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62 
(1974); Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 286 Or. 747, 596 P.2d 1299 (1979); Markle v. Mul- 
holland's, Inc., 265 Or. 259, 509 P.2d 529 (1973). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS 5 402A, Comment c (1965). 
22. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 
YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Cowan, Some Policy Buses of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 
1077 (1965); Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litiga- 
tion, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1185, 1189 (1976); Whitford, Strict Products Liability and the 
Automobile Industry: Much Ado About Nothing, 1968 WIS. L. REV. 83,92-94; Comment, 
Sales of Defective Used Products: Should Strict Liability Apply?, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 805 
(1979). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 402A, Comment c (1965). 
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ucts will introduce certain injuries or costs associated with those 
products into society. The enterprise therefore should be re- 
quired to reflect in its prices the costs of the injuries those prod- 
ucts may cause to consumers. These costs will generally be re- 
flected in the enterprise's insurance premium payments? 
Products that cause more injuries will have higher insurance 
premiums and higher prices. The increased price of such prod- 
ucts will encourage consumers to purchase safer products with 
lower prices? 
Risk spreading or distribution. As a general rule, those who 
are in the business of selling products are in a better position 
that individual buyers to spread the costs of compensating for 
injuries (i.e., insurance costs) and therefore should be required 
to spread these costs among their entire clientele." 
Deterrence or safety incentive. Placing strict liability for 
design and manufacturing defects on the manufacturer and 
those in the original chain of distribution will create a strong 
incentive among retailers and manufacturers, all of whom may 
be held liable, to discourage the manufacture of defective prod- 
ucts and to encourage the manufacture of safer, trouble-free 
Implied representation. By placing a new product on the 
market, the retailer and manufacturer impliedly represent that 
the product is safe if used in a normal and non-abusive manner. 
If the product falls short of the implied representation, the seller 
or manufacturer should be held strictly liable to the injured con- 
sumer or user? 
23. Calabresi, supra note 22, at  499-501; Whitford, supra note 22, at 92-94. 
24. Calabresi, supra note 22, at 502, 514; Comment, Sales of Defective Used Prod- 
ucts: Should Strict Liability Apply?, supra note 22, at  811-13. 
25. See Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 286 Or. at 753-54, 596 P.2d at 1303. See also 
Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 456-60 (1923). 
26. Justice Schaefer stated in Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 
339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969), "The strict liability of a retailer arises from his integral role 
in the overall producing and marketing enterprise and affords an additional incentive to 
safety." Id. at  344,247 N.E.2d at 404 (emphasis added). Justice Traynor in Vandermark 
v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256,391 P.2d 168,37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964), also noted, "In 
other cases the retailer himself may play a substantial part in insuring that the product 
is safe or may be in a position to exert pressure on the manufacturer to that end; the 
retailer's strict liability thus serves as an added incentive to safety." Id. at  262, 391 P.2d 
a t  171-72, 37 Cal. Rptr. at  899. 
27. Discussing this representational theory, Professor Leon Green wrote, 
For a long while, reliance upon warranties and the duty of care has given only 
nominal protection to the injured consumer. Why not simply say to sellers: 
From this day we shall take you at your word. If your products 
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Compensation of the victim. An injured victim should be 
able to obtain compensation as easily as possible. Because strict 
liability requires no proof of negligence, it simplifies the victim's 
burden and facilitates his rec~very.'~ 
A. Strict Liability for Design or Manufacturing Defects 
In light of the public policies outlined, this Comment con- 
cludes that the imposition of strict liability on sellers of used 
products is justified in limited circumstances. The discussion 
that follows will first consider the imposition of strict liability on 
sellers of used goods when design or manufacturing defects are 
present and then will treat the imposition of strict liability on 
sellers of used products when defects arise after the product 
leaves the original distribution chain. 
Enterprise liability. A number of courts have taken the po- 
sition that enterprise liability should be and is the foremost 
public policy mandating the imposition of strict liability on 
manufacturers and retailers for design and manufacturing de- 
fects. However, in the case of sellers of used products, enterprise 
liability should not be the sole basis for imposing strict liability. 
To require sellers of used goods to purchase insurance and re- 
flect in their prices the "costs" of design and manufacturing 
defects will cause an "overstating" of those costs.2e That is, 
under present strict liability case law, manufacturers and retail- 
ers maintain insurance to compensate society for design and 
manufacturing defects that cause injuries. Sellers of used goods 
should not be required to carry "overlapping" insurance to cover 
the same defects and the same injuries. If such "overlapping" 
insurance is forced on the used-products industry, both sellers 
and consumers will be required to spend more money than is 
actually needed to protect society against design and manufac- 
turing defects. The resulting higher prices will lower demand in 
in their normal use injure the qnsumer because of their dangerously 
defective condition or because you have neither adequately warned 
the consumer of the danger of their consumption nor directed him 
how they should be used, the risk is yours. 
Green, supra note 22, at 1191. 
28. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. 
Rptr. 433, 442 (1972). 
29. For a discussion of "overstated coats" and enterprise liability, see Calabresi, 
supra note 22, at 543-44. 
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the used-products industry and may create hardships for con- 
sumers, who will be forced to pay more for used products. 
Fairness considerations also militate against the use of en- 
terprise liability as the sole justification for imposing strict lia- 
bility on used-products sellers for design and manufacturing de- 
fects. In general, "fault" has no place in pure enterprise 
liability.30 At the same time, however, enterprise liability should 
not be used to impose an unnecessary burden on a used-goods 
seller when the injured consumer has a viable cause of action 
against the manufacturer himself. In struggling with this prob- 
lem of fault, the Oregon Supreme Court in Tillman v. Vance 
Equipment Co." imposed strict liability only conditionally. In 
Tillman, the Oregon Supreme Court held that a seller of used 
products would be held liable for design defects only if (1) the 
seller, by making representations to the buyer, became an in- 
surer of the product's safety, or (2) the seller was in a special 
position with the manufacturer, such as a francised seller of new 
and used automobiles. In Tauber-Arons Auctioneers Co. v. Su- 
perior Court," Justice Potter of the Second District California 
Court of Appeal discussed the Tillman decision: 
The rule stated in Tillman is consistent with the policy 
underlying the doctrine of strict liability as developed in this 
state and most recently announced by our Supreme Court [in 
Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245,466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 
178 (1970)l. In holding the volume lessor of tank trucks strictly 
liable for defects in the equipment provided therewith, the 
[California Supreme] court stated that "the paramount policy 
to be promoted by the rule is the protection of otherwise de- 
fenseless victims of manufacturing defects and the spreading 
throughout society of the cost of compensating them." [cita- 
tions omitted]. The [California Supreme] court did not, how- 
ever, abandon all other considerations. In particular, it af- 
firmed the continued vitality of the requirement that the 
imposition of liability "works no injustice to the 
defendants. "99 
Because imposing strict liability on the sellers of used goods 
solely on the basis of enterprise liability may be wasteful and 
unjust, the courts must look to other policy considerations in de- 
30. Id. at 500. 
31. 286 Or. 747, 596 P.2d 1299 (1979). 
32. 101 Cal. App. 3d 268, 161 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1980). 
33. Id. at 283, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 798 (emphasis added). 
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ciding under what conditions strict liability should be imposed 
on sellers of used goods for design and manufacturing defects? 
Risk spreading or distribution. It is undoubtedly true that, 
as a class, sellers of used products are capable of spreading the 
costs of injuries or insuran~e .~  However, even though a used- 
products seller can spread the risks or costs of injuries his prod- 
ucts may cause, risk spreading should not be used as a justifica- 
tion for imposing strict products liability on a used-products 
seller for the same reason that enterprise liability is not a valid 
justification-it results in wasteful, "overlapping" insurance 
costs. This is so because imposition of strict liability on sellers of 
new products already provides the mechanism for insuring soci- 
ety against design and manufacturing defects. 
Deterrence or safety incentive. Since sellers of used prod- 
ucts do not manufacture new products and often operate inde- 
pendently from the manufacturer, imposing strict liability upon 
them will not create greater incentives to manufacture non-de- 
34. Critics may argue that this approach is unjust as to some injured consumers 
because they will have no direct action against a defunct corporation and thus will have 
no remedy. However, as a matter of general corporate law, there are five situations in 
which an acquiring or surviving corporation will assume the liabilities of a "target" or 
purchased corporation: (1) In a statutory merger, (2) in a de facto merger, (3) when fraud 
is present, (4) when the surviving corporation expressly or impliedly agrees to assume 
the liabilities of the purchased corporation, and (5) when the surviving corporation and 
the purchased corporation are owned and operated by the same people, who merely con- 
tinue the business. Thus, even though the corporation which manufactured the defective 
product is no longer in business, it is likely that the victim will still have a cause of 
action against an existing corporation. 
35. See 286 Or. at 754, 596 P.2d at 1303. There will be cases, however, when some 
used-products sellers, because of the small size of their businesses, may not be able to 
effectively "spread the risks." A small business engaged in selling used products may 
remain competitive and attractive to consumers only because it sells products cheaply. It 
is possible, therefore, that by requiring a small business to "spread the risks" or costs of 
an accident (through increased insurance premium costs), a court may be requiring the 
sole proprietor or small businessman to bear the costs himself. C. Robert Morris, Jr. 
expressed this concern in Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The 
Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554, 584-85 (1961): 
The entrepreneur theory also attempts to gain credence by invoking the 
concept of commutative justice. Though the entrepreneur himself is relatively 
blameless, his enterprise entails a certain amount of risk, and it is proper to 
place the burden of this risk upon him in the first instance, because he can 
pass it on to his customers. . . . 
. . . .  
. . . [But] it is probable that customers wil l  not suffer the entire burden of 
enterprise liability. Prices, after all, are determined by the interaction of sup- 
ply and demand. If demand remains stable, an industry cannot raise its prices 
without also decreasing its sales. 
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fective products? However, where the used-products sellers are 
in a special relationship with the manufacturers, imposing strict 
liability on them will create an incentive to produce safer prod- 
ucts similar to the incentive created when retailers of new goods 
are held strictly liable. Thus, where the used-products seller sells 
both new and used products of the manufacturer and is able to 
impose leverage on the manufacturer through a contractual or 
legal right of indemnification, the used-products seller should be 
held strictly liable for design and manufacturing defects." 
Implied representation. The theory of implied representa- 
tion is generally inapplicable to the sales of used goods. Used- 
goods dealers seldom represent that used products will conform 
to any particular safety levels? However, sellers of used goods 
occasionally make oral or written representations that give rise 
to expectations on the part of consumers that the products sold 
are as safe as similar new products. In those cases, the sellers 
have made assurances which should make them liable as insur- 
ers of their products, not on the basis of implied representations, 
36. In Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 286 Or. 747, 596 P.2d 1299 (1979), the Oregon 
Supreme Court noted: 
As to the risk-reduction aspect of strict products liability, the position of 
the used-goods dealer is normally entirely outside the original chain of distri- 
bution of the product. As a consequence, we conclude, any risk reduction 
which would be accomplished by imposing strict liability on the dealer in used 
goods would not be significant enough to justify our taking that step. The 
dealer in used goods generally has no direct relationship with either manufac- 
turers or distributors. Thus, there is no ready channel of communication by 
which the dealer and the manufacturer can exchange information about p q i -  
ble dangerous defects in particular product lines or about actual and potential 
liability claims. 
Id. at 756, 596 P.2d at 1304. 
37. See W. ~ L E  & R. LESHER, supra note 13, g 275, a t  309 where the rule of 
indemnification in strict products liability is set forth: 
[Tlhe general rule is that indemnification is proper in such a case. This is per- 
mitted because of the policy of the law that seeks to place final responsibility 
in such instances upon the party who was initially responsible for placing the 
defective product into the stream of commerce-the party at the beginning of 
the chain of distribution; usually the manufacturer. In accordance with this 
reasoning, it has been held that not only may a retailer obtain indemnification 
from the manufacturer of a defective product, but the manufacturer of a 
finished product is entitled to indemnity from the manufacturer of a compo- 
nent part that was defective at  the time it was received and installed as part of 
the finished product [footnotes omitted]. 
See also Texaco, Inc., v. McGrew Lumber Co., 117 Ill. App. 2d 351, 254 N.E.2d 584 
(1969). 
38. See 286 Or. at 753-56, 596 P.2d at  1303-04. 
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but on the basis of explicit  guarantee^.^@ 
Compensation of the victim. Strict liability makes it some- 
what easier for victims to obtain compensation. As a result, the 
need to compensate victims should prompt the courts to impose 
strict liability whenever it is justified in light of the above dis- 
cussed public policies. Compensation, however, should not be 
the foremost policy justifying strict liability. This would lead to 
absolute liability. 
In summary, to impose strict liability on a seller of used 
products when design or manufacturing defects are present, the 
plaintiff bears the burden of showing: 
1. That the product was defective, i.e., unreasonably dan- 
gerous when sold to him because of a design or manufacturing 
defect; and, 
2. That the seller of used products is in a special relation- 
ship with the manufacturer, or, 
3. That the seller represented to the consumer that he 
would insure the safety of the product or that the product was 
free of defects for normal use purposes. 
In defense the defendant may rebut any of the plaintiffs 
allegations and may bring forth the usual defenses of assump- 
39. In Tillman, the Supreme Court of Oregon enumerated what kinds of representa- 
tions might give rise to liability: 
Those [used-products] markets, generally speaking, operate on the apparent 
understanding that the seller, even though he is in the business of selling such 
goods, makes no particular representation about their quality simply by offer- 
ing them for sale. If a buyer wants some assurance of quality, he typically ei- 
ther bargains for it in the specific transaction or seeks out a dealer who rou- 
tinely offers it (by, for example, providing a guarantee, limiting his stock of 
goods to those of a particular quality, advertising that his used goods are ape- 
cially selected, or in some other fashion). 
Id. at 755, 596 P.2d at 1303. 
In Tauber-Arons, the Second District California Court of Appeals discussed liability 
arising from representation: 
As regards defects created by the original manufacturer, Tillman states a 
sound rule limiting W i t y  of dealers in used equipment. Under the rule as 
stated, a Cadillac dealer who promotes the sale of new Cadillacs by offering 
"near new trade-ins" which are represented as "specially selected" may incur 
liability in respect of an original design defect in a car which he did not origi- 
nally sell, both as a participant in the enterprise that created consumer de- 
mand and by generating "the kind of expectations of safety that the courts 
have held are justifiably created by the introduction of a new product into the 
stream of commerce." (Id., 596 P.2d at 1304.) The ordinary used products 
dealer, however, will not be strictly liable for such defecta created by the 
manufacturer. 
101 Cal. App. 3d at 282, 161 Cal. Rptr. at  797. 
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tion of the risk and misuse of the product?O 
B. Strict Liability and Safety Defects 
Courts do not always make clear what policies underlie the 
imposition of strict liability in individual cases. However, it ap- 
pears that based on Comment c of section 402A of the Restate- 
ment (Second) of Torts, many courts have recognized enterprise 
liability as the foremost policy justifying the imposition of strict 
products liability on sales of used products.41 
40. This Comment relies on the Tillman and Tauber-Arons cases in advocating a 
conditional imposition of strict liability. However, these cases are not the only authority 
advocating a conditional imposition. See also Fischer, Products Liability-Functionally 
Imposed Strict Liability, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 93 (1979); Fischer, Products Liability-The 
Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339 (1974). Professor Fischer has written the 
following: 
A preferred approach is for the judge to decide as a matter of law whether 
a given case is an appropriate one for strict liability. In making this decision, 
he should systematically analyze all factors bearing on the question of whether 
the policies of risk spreading and deterrence can be advanced by the imposi- 
tion of liability without unduly inhibiting industry from continuing to supply 
useful products. 
Fischer, Products Liability-Functionally Imposed Strict Liability, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 93, 
114 (1979). 
Professor Fischer suggests that the following factora be considered: 
I. Risk Spreading 
A. From the point of view of consumer. 
1. Ability of consumer to bear loss. 
2. Feasibility and effectiveness of self-protective measures. 
a. Knowledge of risk. 
b. Ability to control danger. 
c. Feasibility of deciding against use of product. 
B. From the point of view of manufacturer. 
1. Knowledge of risk. 
2. Accuracy of prediction of losses. 
3. Size of losses. 
4. Availability of insurance. 
5. Ability of manufacturer to self-insure. 
6. Effect of increased prices on industry. 
7. Public necessity for the product. 
8. Deterrent effect on the development of new products. 
11. Safety Incentive 
A. Likelihood of future product improvement. 
B. Existence of additional precautions that can presently be taken. 
C. Availability of safer substitutes. 
Id. at 114-15. 
41. One court described its imposition of strict liability on the seller of used bricks 
as being consistent with the Restatement: "These comments were before the courts 
which have adopted Sec. 402A, and there is no reason for asawning that these courts 
were unaware of the fact that comment c clearly adopts the theory of enterprise liability 
as the basis for the rule." Hovenden v. Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302, 310 (Tex. Civ. App. 
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Although the imposition of strict liability and its conse- 
quent insurance costs on the seller of used goods may "over- 
state" the costs to society of design and manufacturing defects, 
this is not the case with defects that arise after the product has 
left the original distribution chain. Manufacturers are ultimately 
responsible for design and manufacturing defects; they do not 
insure against nor are they responsible for defects that arise af- 
ter the product has left the original chain of distribution. Enter- 
prise liability therefore demands that used-products sellers be 
held strictly liable for safety defects in order to protect both 
buyers and unrelated third parties who may be injured by 
them.42 
Although sellers of used products must be held strictly lia- 
ble for safety defects, there are limitations to this liability. The 
condition in the used product causing the injury for which the 
plaintiff sues must in fact be a defect rather than mere wear." A 
defect is a condition in the product that presents unreasonable 
danger that would not be contemplated by the ordinary con- 
~ u m e r . ~ ~  Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A bases 
strict products liability on defects which are unreasonably dan- 
gerous. Some states have abandoned the unreasonably danger- 
ous requirement, but even in those states a defect is nonetheless 
determined in terms of the consumer's reasonable expe~tation.~~ 
Thus, it appears to be appropriate to hold used products sellers 
1975). See also Turner v. International Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. at 284, 336 A.2d 
at 69. 
42. See Turner v. International Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 61 
(1975); Hovenden v. Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). 
Even where there are no implied representations between sellers and buyers of used 
products, public policy favors eliminating safety defects from used products because they 
may harm unrelated third parties. See, e.g., Cornelius v. Bay Motors Inc., 258 Or. 564, 
484 P.2d 299 (1971), where an unrelated third party was "rear-ended" and injured when 
the brakes on a used vehicle purchased that same day failed to stop the car. See also 
Turner v. International Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. at  290-93, 336 A.2d at 69-71. 
43. One commentator concluded, "Since the ordinary consumer should reasonably 
expect that a product will have a finite life, strict liability will not be imposed where the 
defect arises simply because the product has worn out." W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, supra 
note 13, at 113. See also Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 337, 340 (1973). 
44. RESTA~MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 402A, Comments g & i (1965). 
45. In Tauber-Arons Auctioneers Co. v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. App.3d 268, 161 
Cal. Rptr. 789 (1980), the test of a defective product in California was set forth: "The 
'unreasonably dangerous' test has been rejected in California as a necessary factor. 
(Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp. (1972) 8 Cal. 3d 121, 135, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 
1153.) However, failure to satisfy 'ordinary consumer' expectations is still a basis for 
strict liability under California law. (Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. (1978) 20 Cal. 3d 
413, 435, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443.)" Id. at  279 n.1, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 795 n. 1. 
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strictly liable for safety defects, i.e., defects arising out of parts 
ordinarily expected to be regularly maintained and replaced.46 
In addition to the safety-defect limitation on the used-prod- 
ucts seller's strict liability, the defect causing the injury must 
exist at the time the product was sold. Defects arising after the 
product is sold should not give rise to strict liabilit~.~' Determin- 
ing when the defect arises should be a question of fact. However, 
defects in used products may be of two types: presently existing 
defects and developing defects." When presently existing de- 
fects are found in a used product, the seller will be held strictly 
liable on proof of that fact. However, when the product is dan- 
gerous as a result of a developing defect, the trier of fact must 
determine whether a reasonable person would have had the 
product serviced or repaired before the time when the injury oc- 
curred. Since strict liability is limited to safety defects, which 
may occur only in those parts ordinarily expected to be regularly 
maintained or replaced, a reasonable man test seems appropri- 
ate in deciding whether the plaintiff should have had the part 
serviced himself before it developed into the defect that resulted 
in his injury. 
46. See Turner v. International Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62 
(1975): 
Justifiable expectations for safety run to ordinary parts expected to re- 
ceive regular maintenance and replacement, e.g., brake shoes and Wigs,  steer- 
ing linkage, exhaust system, etc. On the other hand, surface dents, rust or 
metal fatigue resulting from mere old age would be defects the risk of which a 
buyer reasonably may be expected to absorb without undue threat to the pub- 
lic at large. 
Id. at 290, 336 A.2d at 69. 
Safety defects may be further defined as something so vital to the safe operation of 
the product that it is expected that the used-products seller will check it thoroughly 
before he sells it to the consumer. On a used car, for example, such safety defects would 
probably include no more than the exhaust system, steering and suspension systems (in- 
cluding tires), and the brake system. See aho W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, supra note 13, at 
113; Annot., supra note 7, at 340. 
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 8 402A(2)(b) (1965). 
48. An example of a presently existing defect may be seen in McLain v. Hodge, 474 
S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971), where the plaintiff purchased a used gun with a defec- 
tive ejector which caused a cartridge to explode in his face. An example of a developing 
defect may be seen in Cornelius v. Bay Motors Inc., 258 Or. 564, 484 P.2d 299 (1971), 
where the "cups" in the master cylinder of a used car's brake system were in the process 
of deteriorating. The day before the car was purchased, the brake system operated 
safely; on the day of the sale the brakes failed, causing a rear-end collision. For an exam- 
ple of a successful defense based on the post-purchase occurrence of the defect, see 
Grady v. Kenny Ross Chevrolet Co., 332 F. Supp. 689 (W.D. Pa. 1971), where the ex- 
haust system was determined to have become defective only after the sale, resulting in 
no liability for the seller. 
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The underlying reasons for a sale of a particular used prod- 
uct may also limit a used-product seller's liability. Where the 
product is sold with the implicit understanding that it is virtu- 
ally or completely worn out or in a dangerous condition and that 
the buyer will have to invest additional time and money in the 
product in order to make it safe or functional, strict liability 
should not be imposed. This situation or limitation will most 
often arise in the sale of antiques." Even with non-antiques, 
when a seller gives explicit and adequate warnings of the inher- 
ent dangers in the product and of the way to use the product to 
avoid injury, and these warnings are ignored, strict liability will 
not be i m p o ~ e d . ~  
When a plaintiff is injured by a safety defect, the plaintiff 
may hold the seller of used goods strictly liable by establishing 
the following: 
1. That the product was defective, i.e., in a condition un- 
reasonably dangerous when sold to him, based upon the rea- 
sonable expectations of an ordinary consumer (safety defect); 
49. Commenting on this facet of the problem, the court in Turner v. International 
Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62 (1975), stated the following: 
Looking at  the used automobile situation, one can readily envision an an- 
tique car buff or "hot rod" enthusiast purchasing a car which is defective in 
many respects and where the relationship between the buyer and seller is such 
that both reasonably expect that all aspects of the automobile will be sepa- 
rately appraised and all defects corrected by the purchaser. In this connection 
see Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 62, 27 Cal. Rptr. 
697, 700, 377 P.2d 897, 900 (1963 Sup. Ct.), in which Justice Traynor stated 
that a manufacturer "is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the 
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to 
have a defect that causes injury to a human being." 
Id. at 292, 336 A.2d at 71 (emphasis in original). 
50. Note the specific warnings and the denial of strict liability to sellers of used 
products in Rix v. Reeves, 23 Ariz. App. 243,532 P.2d 185 (1975), and Pridgett v. Jack- 
son Iron & Metal Co., 253 So.2d 837 (Miss. 1971). 
As a matter of procedural convenience for the plaintiff, when something can be clas- 
sified as a design or manufacturing defect and as a safety defect, the plaintiff should be 
allowed to join as joint tortfeasors both the manufacturer and the used-goods seller. This 
situation might arise, for example, when the original brake shoes on a used automobile 
wear out prematurely and an accident occurs. Since brakes fall within the classification 
of a safety defect, the used-products seller should .have inspected them. At the same 
time, however, it is likely that the materials used by the manufacturer of the brakes were 
substandard, thus constituting a defect in the brake design. Even if there is no special 
relationship between the used-products seller and the manufacturer, the plaintiff should 
be able to sue both as joint tortfeasors. However, if the defect is clearly not a safety 
defect, then the plaintWs only possible cause of action would be against the manufac- 
turer. For some helpful background in this area, see L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra 
note 13, at 5 16A(4)(b)(i) and W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, supra note 13, at  5 54. 
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and, 
2. That the defect caused injury to the plaintiff before a 
reasonable man would have had the part replaced or serviced. 
The defendant may establish any one of the following as a 
defense: 
1. That no safety defect existed, i.e., that the injury was a 
result of wear in parts that a reasonable consumer should not 
expect to have been regularly maintained or replaced; 
2. That the defect arose after the sale, not before; 
3. That the basis of the bargain or essence of the agree- 
ment was that the plaintiff would invest his own time and 
money in the product to make it safe; or 
4. That the defendant gave an adequate and explicit wam- 
ing which the plaintiff disregarded. 
Steven J. Christiansen 
